Undergraduate Transitional Justice Review
Volume 1 | Issue 3

Article 2

2010

What's In a Name?
Kim Cura

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/undergradtjr
Recommended Citation
Cura, Kim (2010) "What's In a Name?," Undergraduate Transitional Justice Review: Vol. 1 : Iss. 3 , Article 2.
Available at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/undergradtjr/vol1/iss3/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Western. It has been accepted for inclusion in Undergraduate Transitional
Justice Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Western. For more information, please contact tadam@uwo.ca, wlswadmin@uwo.ca.

Cura: What's In a Name?

WHAT’S IN A NAME? DARFUR, THE GENOCIDE DEBATE, AND POLITICAL WILL
Kim Cura
In 2004, the United States officially declared the crisis in Darfur, Sudan to be “genocide”. After
much international debate, the International Criminal Court issued a second arrest warrant for
President Omar Al Bashir, charging him for three counts of genocide six years later in July
2010. This paper analyzes various sides of the lengthy debate, from the influences of Rwanda to
the varied responses of the international community, and concludes that mere semantics is
insufficient in addressing human rights violations, particularly such atrocities as those in
Darfur. As ever, political will remains incredibly important.
On the 12th of July, 2010, the International Criminal Court issued a second arrest warrant for
Sudanese president Omar Al Bashir, charging him for three counts of genocide according to
Article 6(a), 6(b), and 6(c) of the Rome Statute.1 This is the first—and so far the only—incident
of genocide that the ICC has officially recognized in its young history. The warrant states that, in
their counter-insurgency campaign, President Bashir’s government has inflicted serious mental
and bodily harm, committed acts of forcible transfer and created conditions of life tantamount to
physical destruction, on members of the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa groups in the Darfur region.2
This indictment also comes a startling seven years after the conflict first started in February
2003, owing to the long line of international inquiry and controversy over the actual scale of the
Darfur conflict. While many, including the United States, believed the killings to be acts of
“genocide,” others chose to describe them as “ethnic cleansing” or “crimes against humanity.”
Following a very brief overview of the conflict to date, this paper will analyze various sides of
the genocide debate by looking at the possible influences of Rwanda’s legacy on the decision to
collectively label the atrocities as genocide, the resulting terminological dispute, and how
international actors have responded to the crisis.
1

International Criminal Court, “Second Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir,”
The Hague: Pre-Trial Chamber I, 2010, 8. http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc907140.pdf.
2
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Ultimately, this paper will argue that while describing Darfur as the “twenty-first
century’s first genocide” is certainly groundbreaking, mere semantics are insufficient in
addressing the conflict in Darfur, where many thousands continue to suffer. Political will of
important actors remains a crucial factor in addressing not only the crisis at hand, but also all
human rights abuses around the world.
Many consider the Darfur conflict to be “a problem within a problem”—yet another
pocket of violence in Sudan’s already bloody history. Since its independence from Britain in
1956, the northern and southern regions of Sudan have been in a near constant state of civil war,
stirred by successively oppressive regimes in Khartoum and the perpetuation of the biased
economic strata developed by the British to serve their colonial interests.3 Darfur is yet another
one of several marginalized regions in Sudan whose people have suffered “at the hands of the
political and economic elites of the Nile valley and central Sudan.”4 The rebel attacks on
government troops in 2003 were representative of long-standing grievances with the Khartoum
government for its continued hoarding of wealth and resources, as well as a call for the
marginalized groups to be included in power-sharing negotiations with the Sudan People’s
Liberation Army (SPLA) for a resolution to the north-south conflict.5 In response, the Sudanese
government, with its proxy militia, the Janjaweed, carried out a brutal campaign targeting
specific civilian groups and villages to which members of the rebel groups—the Sudan
Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)—belong. The result was
large-scale violence that has since displaced upwards of two million people; there are also many
3

John Prendergast and Colin Thomas Jensen, “Sudan: A State on the Brink?” Current History
108, no. 718 (2009): 208; Mansour Khalid, “Darfur: A Problem within a Wider Problem,” in
Darfur and the Crisis of Governance in Sudan: A Critical Reader, ed. Salah M. Hassan and
Carina E. Ray (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2009), 35.
4
Joyce Apsel, “The Complexity of Destruction in Darfur: Historical Processes and Regional
Dynamics,” Human Rights Review 10, no. 2 (2009): 241.
5
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reports of sexual violence, torture, and mass killings.6 Following his first warrant of arrest issued
by the ICC in March 2009, President Bashir expelled thirteen international humanitarian
organizations and shut down the three largest domestic relief groups in the region, thereby
exacerbating the humanitarian crisis.7 Overall, the UN estimates that 4.7 million people,
including the roughly two million displaced, are still grossly affected by the conflict.8
The memory of Rwanda rings poignantly in the international community’s response to
the Darfur conflict. From 2003 to early 2004 the tenth anniversary of the Rwandan genocide
played a key role in shaping the world’s response to the crisis in Darfur, invoking the world’s
failure to intervene in Rwanda in April 1994 as well as to recognize the violence as genocide.
Many international human rights NGOs, including the prominent US-based group Save Darfur,
were also quick to use Rwanda to call attention to the Darfur crisis, using the evocative slogan,
“Never again.”9 Fusing together Rwanda and Darfur in their reports, they effectively used the
memory of the 1994 genocide to play on the shame and “failure” of the international community
in order to spark a response to the emerging violence in Darfur.10 Following suit, national and
international policymakers found many similarities between the two cases and used them to
launch their appeals for action in the international community. Kofi Annan called upon the
anniversary of the Rwandan genocide to state his appeal to the international community for
action in Darfur, and former U.N. force commander Roméo Dallaire also invoked his own
experiences during the Rwandan genocide to plea for action.11 Even in the U.S., Rwanda’s
6

Apsel, “The Complexity of Destruction in Darfur,” 241.
Predergast and Jensen, “Sudan: A State on the Brink?” 211.
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Save Darfur, “What Has Happened in Darfur?” Accessed December 18, 2010,
http://www.savedarfur.org/pages/primer.
9
Darren Brunk, “Dissecting Darfur: Anatomy of a Genocide Debate,” International Relations
22, no. 1 (2008): 31.
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legacy became a recurrent theme throughout the U.S. Congressional discussion on Darfur, which
eventually led to the passing of a resolution labelling the Darfur conflict as genocide in the
summer of 2004.12 Finally, early in his presidency, George W. Bush famously wrote “NOT ON
MY WATCH” in the margins of a National Security Council report detailing an investigation
into former president Clinton’s response to the violence in Rwanda and Burundi.13 Hence,
through the framework of the Rwandan genocide, Darfur became something like a reincarnation
of the 1994 crisis—a chance for the international community to redeem itself by responding
promptly to the conflict and not to shy away from investigating the potential for the occurrence
of genocide.
“Not another Rwanda” became a very important theme in the United State’s response to
Darfur in particular; indeed, it was the U.S. that took the lead in condemning the atrocities in
Darfur as acts of genocide, perhaps largely as a way of avoiding the same mistake of not
intervening in the Rwandan genocide. The rhetoric of genocide reached a fever pitch in the U.S.
in 2004 due in significant part to the evangelical Christian community, which had taken interest
in the plight of black Christians in southern Sudan.14 Moreover, there was a growing left-right
coalition on Darfur, with human rights advocates and high-level U.S. officials calling on the
government to prevent the emergence of genocide in the region.15 This domestic political
pressure, coupled with the Bush administration’s determination not to fall into the same trap as
its predecessor, eventually led to the creation of an investigative team for Darfur (discussed in
12

Ibid., 33; Eric Markusen, “Three Empirical Investigations of Alleged Genocide in Darfur,” in
The World and Darfur: International Response to Crimes Against Humanity in Western Sudan,
ed. Amanda F. Grzyb (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009), 95.
13
Stephen A. Kostas, “Making the Determination of Genocide in Darfur,” in Genocide in
Darfur: Investigating the Atrocities in the Sudan, ed. Samuel Totten and Eric Markusen (New
York: Routledge, 2006), 114.
14
Ibid., 115; Eric A. Heinze, “The Rhetoric of Genocide in U.S. Foreign Policy: Rwanda and
Darfur Compared,” Political Science Quarterly 122, no. 3 (2007): 361.
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Heinze, “The Rhetoric of Genocide in U.S. Foreign Policy,” 361.
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further detail below) and the U.S.’ official declaration of genocide in Darfur in the summer of
2004. The Rwandan analogy therefore transformed Darfur from another case of massive human
rights violations to a severe humanitarian crisis and high-level security concern, thereby creating
the circumstances for swift and appropriate action, especially from the U.S.16
In their 2005 op-ed that was published in The Nation, Africa Action directors Salih
Booker and Ann-Louise Colgan wrote that “we should have learned from Rwanda that to stop
genocide, Washington must first say the word,”17 referring to the international community’s
reluctance to use the “g-word” with regards to Rwanda. Avoiding the use of “genocide” in the
case of Rwanda was once symbolic of resistance to action; now, the application of pressure not
to make the same blunder in the case of Darfur became symbolic of positive action on the part of
the international community. The legacy of Rwanda certainly had a profound effect on the way
prominent international actors chose to address the Darfur crisis; however, the official U.S.
statement that the Darfur crisis indeed constituted genocide incited not immediate action, as
would have been ideal, but further debate. A terminological discussion on what exactly
constituted genocide and whether or not the Darfur crisis fit the genocide category continued for
a few years after the U.S. statement. Interestingly, the greatest scepticism came from the United
Nations itself.
The determination of “genocide” followed a detailed and substantially-funded process.
Spurred by domestic pressure and its retrospective regret towards the Rwandan genocide, the
U.S. State Department sponsored the Darfur Atrocities Documentation Project (ADP) in 2004, a
field investigation whose main goal was to determine whether acts of genocide had been and/or

16
17

Brunk, “Dissecting Darfur,” 35.
Ibid.
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were continuing in the region.18 Working closely with the American Bar Association, the Darfur
Atrocities Documentation Team (ADT) conducted interviews with Sudanese refugees and
displaced persons in Chad and compiled detailed reports of their findings.19 Their collected
evidence includes personal witnessing or experiences of killing of family and nonfamily
members, shooting, death from displacement, abduction, beating, rape, hearing racial epithets,
village destruction, theft of livestock, aerial bombing, and destruction and looting of personal
property.20 In regard to the perpetrators, forty-eight percent (48%) of the refugees identified both
the Janjaweed and the Sudanese military.21 Furthermore, the investigation revealed four more
key findings: that villages of black Africans were attacked and destroyed while nearby Arab
villages were not; that a large number of men were killed, while a large number of women were
raped; that the means for existence like livestock and water were respectively killed and polluted;
and that the Sudanese government prevented both medical care and humanitarian assistance from
being delivered to IDP camps.22 All in all, the ADP revealed that Khartoum’s strategy was
essentially to arm and provide air support to the Janjaweed, who were allowed to attack villages,
kill, rape, and forcibly displace at will members of the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa tribes—large
components of the “non-Arab” population.23 All of this evidence points to a distinct genocidal
pattern. As such, then Secretary of State Colin Powell testified before the Senate in September
2004 that “the evidence leads us to the conclusion [...] that genocide has occurred and may still

18

Samuel Totten, “The U.S. Investigation into the Darfur Crisis and Its Determination of
Genocide: A Critical Analysis,” in Genocide in Darfur: Investigating the Atrocities in the Sudan,
ed. Samuel Totten and Eric Markusen (New York: Routledge, 2006), 199.
19
Ibid., 200; John Hagan and Wenona Rymond-Richmond, Darfur and the Crime of Genocide
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), xviii.
20
Totten, “The U.S. Investigation,” 200.
21
Totten, “The U.S. Investigation,” 200.
22
Ibid., 201-2.
23
Heinze, “The Rhetoric of Genocide in U.S. Foreign Policy,” 360.
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be occurring in Darfur. We believe the evidence corroborates the specific intent of the
perpetrators to destroy ‘a group in whole or in part,’ the words of the [Genocide] Convention.”24
This declaration marks the first time that the Genocide Convention has been used to
diagnose genocide; however, even with this historic declaration, the international community,
particularly the U.N., remained sceptical for a very long time, owing to the ambiguity of intent in
the Darfur conflict. The Convention defines “genocide” as,
any of a number of acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnic, racial or religious group: killing members of the group; causing serious
bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group
conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; and forcibly transferring
children of the group to another group.25
In keeping with the findings of the ADP, the U.S. believed that the Sudanese government, along
with the Janjaweed, carried out a systematic campaign to eliminate the Fur, Masalit, and
Zaghawa groups from Darfur. However, prior to the official statement by the ICC, the European
Union and other humanitarian organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty
International avoided calling the conflict a “genocide,” preferring instead the term “ethnic
cleansing,”26 which denotes the massive killings of a certain section of the population in order to
frighten the survivors away and occupy their land, but without the intent of eliminating the entire
group.27 Furthermore, shortly after the U.S. declaration, former U.N. Secretary-General Kofi
Annan decided to convene a team of experts in October 2004 to conduct their own investigation
into the possibility of genocide in Darfur. The U.N. Commission of Experts then concluded in
24

Quoted in Hagan and Rymond-Richmond, Darfur and the Crime of Genocide, xviii.
United Nations General Assembly, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, August 16, 1994, accessed December 18, 2010,
http://www.hrweb.org/legal/genocide.html.
26
Klejda Mulaj, “Forced Displacement in Darfur, Sudan: Dilemmas of Classifying the Crimes,”
International Migration 46, no. 2 (2008): 32.
27
Gérard Prunier, Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University
Press, 2005), 155.
25
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the negative, claiming that it could not determine the specific intent required to classify the
crimes as genocide; it chose instead to label the atrocities as “war crimes” and “crimes against
humanity.”28
Intent is a crucial factor in the genocide debate. While the systematic nature of the attacks
by the Sudanese government and the Janjaweed may reveal genocidal intent, there are many
other elements that suggest the lack of such intent. The U.N. Commission insisted that those who
planned and organized the attacks on villages aimed to drive the victims from their homes,
primarily for counter-insurgency warfare and not to eliminate the groups completely.29 In a
number of villages that they had attacked, the Janjaweed and government forces refrained from
killing the people who had not fled, but rather killed selectively groups of young men.30
Furthermore, until recently, the Sudanese government generally allowed humanitarian
organizations to work in refugee camps, calling into question its supposed genocidal intent to
bring about the extinction of the pertinent ethnic groups.31 However, many scholars also criticize
this reasoning, pointing out that substantial portions of the attacked groups were in fact killed
during the attacks, with many more dying in the aftermath—which is in keeping with the
language of the Genocide Convention that refers to the intent to destroy a protected group “in
whole or in part.”32
Furthermore, the “beyond reasonable doubt” assumption that the U.N. Commission took
might have set too high a standard for the purpose of the investigation; many find this
problematic, considering that the commission was convened merely to create a threshold finding
28

Ibid., 32.
Mahmood Mamdani, “The Politics of Naming: Genocide, Civil War, Insurgency,” in Darfur
and the Crisis of Governance in Sudan: A Critical Reader, ed. Salah M. Hassan and Carina E
Ray (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2009), 147.
30
Mulaj, “Forced Displacement in Darfur, Sudan,” 36.
31
Ibid., 36.
32
Markusen, “Three Empirical Investigations of Alleged Genocide in Darfur,” 103.
29
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upon which the U.N. Security Council would determine additional action and not to determine
the fate of individual defendants.33 Nevertheless, the Security Council did pass Resolution 1593,
after reviewing evidence collected by the U.N., in March 2005, thereby referring the case of
Darfur to the International Criminal Court.34 Secretary-General Kofi Annan also included a list
of fifty-one names of people suspected of grave crimes under international law, as well as nine
boxes with more than 2500 pieces of evidence, including photos, video footage, interview
transcripts, and other documents.35 Shortly after, in June 2005, ICC Prosecutor Luis MorenoOcampo declared that there was sufficient evidence to put the case of Darfur under the Court’s
jurisdiction. An official ICC investigation was then opened.36
This prolonged debate can be viewed in two ways, on opposite sides of the spectrum. On
one hand, never before has a case of alleged genocide been studied so thoroughly by both
countries and international organizations. It is also the first time that a country has accused
another country of genocide using the 1948 Genocide Convention. Moreover, it is again the first
time that the U.N. has commissioned an investigation into an ongoing crisis to assess the
possibility of genocide and then refer the case to an international court. Considering the
reluctance of the international community to respond to the Rwandan genocide in 1994, these
breakthroughs are significant. They certainly indicate a willingness on the part of important
international actors to establish a rule of law in the international system and exact punitive action
on perpetrators of human rights violations. On the other hand, mere study is not enough, and the
length of time with which the international community debated over what label to use was a
wasted opportunity to halt the atrocities in Darfur at an earlier time. One does not deny that the
33

Ibid., 104.
Ibid., 105.
35
Markusen, “Three Empirical Investigations of Alleged Genocide in Darfur,” 106.
36
Ibid., 106.
34
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evidence collected and the studies conducted will definitely benefit future investigations into
human rights abuses, but both the length of the debate and the label of “genocide” now seem to
have had minimal effects. It has yet to be seen how the international community will respond to
Darfur now that the ICC has charged President Bashir with genocide, but since the start of the
conflict in 2003 the international community has done very little beyond conducting
investigations and referring the case to the ICC.
It would seem that the genocide debate has brought with it confusion in the international
community about what to do with the Darfur crisis, as well as illustrated that mere declaration is
insufficient; it must be accompanied by the political will to act. The world was presented with
two verdicts: the unambiguous U.S. position that Darfur was indeed the site of an ongoing
genocide, and the ambiguous U.N. position that the actions of the Sudanese government and the
Janjaweed, while not genocidal in nature, were nonetheless directed against civilians in the form
of war crimes and crimes against humanity. With the delay in responding to the crisis when it
first began in 2003, and then with the ongoing debate about semantics that followed in
succeeding years, it would seem that genocide must actually happen before the international
community is willing to intervene.37
Moreover, political interests also overrode intervention in Darfur, particularly for the
United States. Even with its certainty that genocide was indeed occurring in Darfur, the U.S.,
through Colin Powell, maintained that “no new action is dictated by this determination. We have
been doing everything we can to get the Sudanese government to act responsibly.”38 What, then,
37

Munzoul A.M. Assal, “Locating Responsibilities: National and International Responses to the
Crisis in Darfur,” in Darfur and the Crisis of Governance in Sudan: A Critical Reader, ed. Salah
M. Hassan and Carina E. Ray (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2009), 291.
38
Quoted in Gerald Caplan, “From Rwanda to Darfur: Lessons Learned?” in Genocide in
Darfur: Investigating the Atrocities in the Sudan, ed. Samuel Totten and Eric Markusen (New
York: Routledge, 2006), 177.
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was the significance of calling the Darfur crisis an incident of genocide in the first place?
Understandably, the U.S. had its hands tied militarily, with two wars concurrently ongoing since
2003. With its military personnel thoroughly preoccupied in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S.
could not expend more resources on Darfur, and the several phases of military disintegration in
both wars are likely to take up most of the attention for the next few years.39 Additionally, for
much of the Bush administration, the war on terror took precedence over genocide. There are
reports in 2005 of Sudan being a “crucial intelligence asset to the CIA,” given that Osama Bin
Laden resided in the country for some time.40 Indeed, it was revealed that the CIA had sent a
plane to Khartoum to bring General Salah Abdallah Gosh, one of the fifty-one suspects named
by the U.N. Commission in Darfur, to Washington to discuss terrorism with the administration.41
Declaring genocide created the appropriate legal and political space for intervention, but in the
few years following Colin Powell’s speech, the U.S. has not carried out any concrete action for
Darfur. This could, ironically, render the genocide determination to be counterproductive, as lack
of tangible results may eventually minimize the “weight” and significance of such a finding.42
The difficulties that the international community faces in addressing the Darfur crisis
stems also from the anarchic nature of the international system. Without a world government,
political will of each actor plays a significant role in any global effort, and furthering
intervention in Darfur is no exception. Thus far, President Bashir has been staunchly disinclined
to cooperate with any international actors, particularly after the two arrest warrants were issued
by the ICC.

Moreover, the U.N. has faced its own internal difficulties in deploying

39

Todd Michael Lane and Scott Nicholas Romaniuk, “‘Too little, too late’? A Strategy for the
Prevention of War Crimes, Genocide, and Crimes Against Humanity in Darfur (Sudan),” Journal
of Peace, Conflict, and Development 14 (2009): 24.
40
Caplan, “From Rwanda to Darfur: Lessons Learned?” 178.
41
Ibid., 178.
42
Totten, “The U.S. Investigation,” 218.
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peacekeeping forces to the region. The U.N. Security Council Resolution 1706, passed in August
2006, was not overly firm, as the first article states that “the U.N. Security Council invites the
consent of the government of national unity for the deployment of U.N. troops in Darfur,” as at
that time the Sudanese government had a ban on any role for the U.N. in the region.43
Furthermore, the vote was not unanimous, nor was it clear in the resolution whether consent was
necessary. . As a result, member states were reluctant to pledge troops knowing that they would
be in great danger.44 Resolution 1769 came a year later, in July 2007, which was unanimously
adopted and accepted by the Khartoum government. Unlike its predecessor, this resolution
authorized the deployment of a 26000-strong joint U.N.-African Union force (collectively called
UNAMID) that would work towards stemming the violence in Darfur.45 However, after around
three years of being stationed in Darfur, UNAMID still has a variety of problems that undermine
its efficiency, including command structures and logistical issues like transportation and
aviation, funding, human resources, and a lack of sufficient training for troops on the ground.46
Geopolitical strategic interests have also made it difficult for the international community
to take appropriate action. On one hand, many largely view Sudan as a “rogue” state that breeds
terrorism and commits horrific human rights abuses on its own citizens. On the other, many,
particularly China, still view Sudan as a country with which it must do business. The Chinese
government has been President Bashir’s strongest-albeit somewhat indirect- supporter,
particularly because of its US $8.5 billion investment in Sudan’s oil sector.47 Calling the
Sudanese government out on its human rights violations risks large investments for the Chinese;
moreover, the Chinese government unsurprisingly remains neutral on the grounds of human
43

Assal, “Locating Responsibilities,” 292.
Assal, “Locating Responsibilities,” 292.
45
Ibid., 293.
46
Ibid., 293; Lane and Romaniuk, “‘Too little, too late’?” 27.
47
Prendergast and Jensen, “Sudan: A State on the Brink?” 211.
44

223
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/undergradtjr/vol1/iss3/2

12

Cura: What's In a Name?

rights abuses in Darfur, given that it too commits abuses within its own borders.48 It prefers to
maintain an economic relationship with Sudan and refuses to comment on any human rights
violations, insisting on Sudan’s sovereignty and its right to address issues within its own borders
without external judgment or intervention. Given their economic relationship, China is in a prime
position to influence Khartoum’s behaviour; however, thus far, it has remained staunchly silent.
Sudan’s African neighbours have also been rather inactive, particularly after the ICC issued its
arrest warrants; though the majority of African countries are signatories to the Rome Statute,
many have allowed President Bashir to visit their countries without arresting him.49 Much as
with the genocide debate, the international community as a whole remains confused with respect
to the best way to intervene in Darfur.
Now that President Bashir has officially been charged with genocide by the ICC, the old
adage that “time will tell” certainly stands, which is in keeping with the dominant theme of
action taken towards Darfur. It has taken a long time for key international actors to identify the
violence in Darfur as an act of genocide, after much confusion and debate. Even to this day, the
confusion stands. This confusion can be attributed to various strategic interests and a lack of
consensus among major international actors, which leads to varying ways of dealing with the
Khartoum government. It is also clear from the case of Darfur that using the term “genocide”
may not carry as much weight as many would believe. While major powers may tout the term as
a way of sparking a call to action, international intervention depends very much on the political
will of all pertinent parties: a move on one hand to extend one’s focus beyond the national
interest to help eradicate human rights abuses beyond one’s own borders, and on the other, to be
open to external criticism and examine one’s actions with a critical eye. It would seem at the
48

Ibid., 211.
BBC, “‘No question’ of Chad arresting Sudan President Bashir,” BBC World News, July 22,
2010, accessed December 19, 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-10723558.
49
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moment that the promise in Rwanda’s legacy of “never again” still hangs in the balance, but that,
on a positive note, the first step of identifying the Darfur crisis and bringing it to international
attention has been taken. Now all that remains is yet another opportunity for the international
community to take a stand—one that, hopefully, will yield encouraging results.
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